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TRANSFUSION OF SH VIRUS -
TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION
N o area of the law has experienced more rapid change
than that presently evidenced in the area of products
liability.' The philosophy of products liability, perhaps best
stated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,2 is one of
reallocating the risk of economic injury to the entire society.
3
Is this new social policy to be a universal policy, or are some
institutions and organizations to retain a favored position in
this new legal framework of consumer protection?
Blood transfusions are an invaluable aid to medical science
and doubtless save many thousands of lives each year. There
are, however, attendant dangers in the transfusion of blood,
and undoubtedly one of the most prominent of these dangers
is the contraction of homologous serum hepatitis. 4 Given both
the idea of consumer protection, embodied in the doctrine of
products liability, and the use of the blood transfusion, an
admittedly invaluable aid to medical science, who is to bear
the cost of an allegedly unavoidable injury caused by serum
hepatitis infection?
I. SERUM HEPATITIS
Serum hepatitis is a disease of the liver caused by the
inoculation of human blood or blood products containing a
1 For excellent analyses of the growth of products liability law see: Pros-
ser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without
Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963);
Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeon-
hole and Communication Barriers, 17 WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 5 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Shanker].
2 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
"[T]o insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturer that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves." Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
4 "Serum hepatitis... is [an] exclusively man-made [disease]. It is de-
finable as the syndrome or group of signs and symptoms produced arti-
ficially by innoculation with a filterable agent known as virus B. The
virus may be introduced through the skin by deliberate administration,
for therapeutic (curative) purposes, of human blood or certain of its
products obtained from one who is not apparently ill but is carrying virus
B in his blood. It may also be introduced ... through [the] use of inade-
quately sterilized syringes, needles, stylets or cutting instruments that
penetrate the skin or mucus membrane." 14 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS
Hepatitis § 5 (1964).
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causative (SH) virus.5  Recent medical research has signifi-
cantly increased the detection rate of SH virus in donor blood;
but, no test has been developed to discover all incidents of
"bad" blood.6
The disease is contracted by about 30,000 people yearly;
up to 10 percent of that number die. 7 Since this strain of
hepatitis (SH virus) is contracted primarily by the use of in-
adequately sterilized instruments or by transfusion of plasma
or whole blood containing the SH virus,' the cause of death or
disease in a particular case is relatively clear.
The question then becomes one of policy. Is the hospital
or blood bank, indisputably the transferor of the causative
agent, to be held legally liable for the injury sustained by the
patient? Or does the doctrine of consumer protection, em-
bodied in the developing law of products liability, not extend
so far as to make a supplier of an admittedly valuable product
liable to an innocent consumer absent supplier "fault"? This
in essence is the policy decision with which the courts have
been forced to come to grips. They are faced with a poten-
tially large group of litigants (patients who have contracted
serum hepatitis) seeking redress against a group of institu-
tions traditionally favored in our legal framework.! In this
setting the courts have been forced to fashion rules to facili-
tate or deny recovery to patients infected by serum hepatitis.
It is the purpose of this note to explore in Part III two theories
that are available to a plaintiff seeking recovery for injuries
caused by the transfusion of infected blood. But first a look
at the theory which has prevailed for many years.
II. THE EARLIER VIEW - PERLMUTTER
The landmark case defining the extent of liability for
transfusion of "bad" blood is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hos-
pital.10 The court denied recovery against the hospital on the
basis that a transfusion of blood by a hospital to a patient
5 BEESON & McDERMOTT, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 1032 (1963).
6 M. Prince and K. Burlee, Serum Hepatitis Antigen (SH): Rapid Detec-
tion by High Velocity Voltage Immunoelechoosmophoresis, 169 SCIENCE
593 (1970).
7 Bockel, Tests for Australian Antigen Answer a Need, 97 SCIENCE NEWS
584 (1970).
S See note 4 supra.
9Hospitals and charitable institutions (non-profit blood banks) tradi-
tionally were not subject to tort liability. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127
at 1019 (3d. ed. 1964). Although this immunity is presently breaking
down, it still persists in a number of jurisdictions. Id. at 1021-24.
10 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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was a service rather than a sale. ' There was a strong dissent
on the grounds that to rule that the transfusion of blood was
a service and not a sale was contrary to the then existing
New York case law.1'2 The majority, however, seemed to reach
their decision not so much on the basis of the sales-service
dichotomy but rather upon the basic policy issue of exempting
a hospital from liability for the transfusion of a virus it could
not detect.
13
Although the majority opinion of Perlmutter has been
severely criticized in the literature,1 4 the service rationale has
been adopted by a number of jurisdictions both as to hos-
pitals 15 and blood banks' 6 supplying infected blood. The under-
lying policy decision of denying recovery in transfusion cases
by classfying the transfusion of blood as a service rather than
a sale is made glaringly apparent by the fact that many cases
are now being decided, in other areas of the law, that are ex-
11 "[S]uch a contract is clearly one for services, and, just as clearly, it is
not divisable. Concepts of purchase and sale cannot separately be at-
tached to the healing materials-such as medicines, drugs or indeed,
blood-supplied by the hospital for a price as part of medical services it
offers. That the property or title to certain items of medical materials
may be transfered, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient during
the course of medical treatment does not serve to make such a transaction
a sale. ' "Sale" and "transfer" are not synonymous,' and not every trans-
fer of personal property constitutes a sale." Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
12-The three dissenting justices felt that no distinction could be drawn
between the furnishing of blood by a hospital and the case law of New
York holding that implied warranties attached to the sale of food in a
restaurant, Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924); or to
the sale of drugs Hopkins & Co. v. Silverman, 234 App. Div. 224, 254
N.Y.S. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Id. at 110, 123 N.E.2d at 797-98.
1:1 The majority recognized that if the transfer of blood were considered
a sale, liability would attach for breach of warranty. They then made
a very obvious policy decision based upon the undetectable nature of
the hepatitis virus and declared: "The art of healing frequently calls
for the balancing of risks and dangers to a patient. Consequently, if in-
jury results from the course adopted, where no negligence or fault is
present liability should not be imposed upon the institution or agency
actually seeking to save or assist the patient." Id. at 107, 123 N.E.2d
at 795.
14Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospital's Liabil-
ity for Hepatitis - Contaminated Blood on Principles of Strict Tort Lia-
bility, 48 CHL BAR REc. 204 (1967); Haut & Alter, Blood Transfusions-
Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 557 (1969); 37 NOTRE DAME LAW.
565 (1962) ; 18 OKLA. L. REV. 104 (1965); U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955).
15 Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); White
v. Sarascta Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968); Holder
v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Dibblee vs. Dr. W. H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961)
(charitable immunity a factor in transfusing incompatible blood); Gile
v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956)
(charitable immunity a factor).
16 Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d
584 (1965) (charitable blood bank); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Koenig v.
Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
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tending sales warranties to cases that admittedly involve serv-
ice transactions.
1 T
In recent years a few courts have chosen to alter the
obviously artificial sales-service distinction involved in blood
transfusion litigation and have held that a cause of action
exists in either tort"s or under the Uniform Commercial
Code,1" on the theory that either a hospital,
20 a blood bank ,21
or both*-'" have made a sale of blood within the respective
definitions of "seller" established by the two doctrines. The
recent case of Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital3 has gone so
far as to hold that this artificial sales-service distinction may
be immaterial. "II]t cannot be said with certainty that no re-
covery is permissible upon the claim here made, even if it
should ultimately be determined that the transfer of blood from
a hospital for transfusion into a patient is a service.
2 4
The subsequent discussion will deal with those recent cases
deciding upon what grounds a cause of action may be stated
in a suit predicated on contraction of serum hepititus by
transfusion.
17 WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 242 b (1948) (Sale of food in a restau-
rant justified imposition of an implied warranty of fitness); Amacorp
Indus. Leasing Co. v. Robert C. Young Assoc., Inc., 47 Cal. Rptr. 294, 237
Cal. App. 2d 724 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (leasing of equipment implies
warranty); Newark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11
(1968) (injury as a result of the application of a permanent wave hair
dressing, court allowing recovery on the basis of implied warranty
despite the service character of the application); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (implied war-
ranty in leasing agreement for trucks). Cantra, Epstein v. Giannattasso,
25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963) (denying recovery on the
basis of rendition of services rather than the sale of goods); see Farns-
worth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 653 (1957).
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
1
) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103 (d).
20 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d
733 (1969), alf'd Ill. Sup. Ct. Nos. 42526, 42578 cons. (Mar. 1970) (finding
that plaintiff had stated a cause of action on the basis of a sale).
21 Russell v. Community Blood Bank Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1966), aff'd 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733,
304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (Perlmutter "sales-service" rationale
rejected as to commercial blood bank); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp.,
439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 86 (1970) (not determining the issue of sale but
implying that the absence of a sale should not in itself bar recovery).
= 'Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
23 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
24 Id. at page 505, 267 A.2d at 870.
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III. CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of warranty under the Code25 and the tort law's
counterpart, strict liability, 6 are the modern doctrines that
have developed in the law to facilitate an injured party's re-
covering without a showing of fault or negligence on the part
of a seller.2 7 While the pleading of a cause of action in strict
liability does not preclude a pleading of breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability, or vice versa, an examination of
the recent blood transfusion cases shows that often only one
of the two causes of action-strict liability-has been advanced.
A. Strict Liability
Strict liability in tort is a concept first developed to avoid
the injustices created by the earlier sales laws requiring the
presence of privity of contract for one to recover for injuries
caused by deleterious products intended for human consump-
tion and intimate bodily use. 28 Drugs entered the developing
body of law on the analogy that they, like food and drink,
were intended for human consumption and that the same social
policy supporting liability for furnishing unwholesome food
25 The sections of the Uniform Commercial Code pertinent to stating a
cause of action for breach of implied warranty are: "a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1). And secondly, ". . . goods to be merchant-
able must be at least such as are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used." Id. § 2-314 (2) (c).
26 The strict liability cause of action referred to here is that set out in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1965). Although it may be
argued that there are two distinct causes of action for strict liability in
tort, i.e. implied warranty or strict liability absent warranty, it is felt
that the two causes are identical and that although a case predicated on
a cause of strict liability in tort may talk of implied warranty, "the
'warranty' is a very different kind of warranty from those usually
found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract
rules which have grown up to surround such sales." Id. at Comment m.
It is not necessary then to allege an implied warranty to state a cause of
action in strict liability but neither does talk of implied warranty mean
that a cause of action is being stated on a theory other than that stated
by § 402A supra. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill.
App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), aff'd Ill. Sup. Ct. Nos. 42526, 42578
cons. (Mar. 1970); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d
182 (1965); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65
(1969); Leavell, The Return of Caveat Venditor as the Law of Products
Liability, 23 ARK. L. REV. 355, 360 (1970).
"[Fireedom from negligence is not a defense to a breach of warranty
or to an action based on strict liability in tort.... If the facts show a
defective condition constituting a breach of the applicable warranty or a
breach of the duty to provide a truck fit for use, and the condition pro-
duces injury or damages, liability exists." Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
& Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 452, 212 A.2d 769, 779 (1965).
2_sProsser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV., 791 (1966).
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was equally applicable to the furnishing of defective drugs.2 9
The case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.30 ex-
panded the doctrine of strict tort liability to the manufacturers
of products intended for human use, and the earlier criterion
of products intended for human consumption was abandoned
in favor of a general body of products liability law. The
emphasis was on avoidance of technical rules that had often
barred recovery on a contract theory.-" The result was that if
pleaded in tort, lack of privity would no longer defeat recovery
for anyone reasonably expected to use the warranted article.
32
The basic policy of the new tort was to insure that the manu-
facturers of defective products would be required to bear the
losses from injuries caused by these defective products rather
than the innocent consumer who was powerless to protect him-
self against such losses.
33
The courts of Florida have decided three cases seeking
recovery on a theory of strict liability in tort and have
reached different conclusions as to the possibilities of impos-
ing liability depending upon the status of the defendant. As
against a hospital both Hoder v. Sayet34 and White v. Public
Hospital Board' 5 held that no cause of action was stated
for breach of an implied warranty in tort. While in Hoder
and Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.3" (appealed and
reversed on other grounds) it was held that a cause of action
was stated against a commercial blood bank. 7 This means, at
least in Florida, that although the sales-service theory of Perl-
29 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960). This case involved the ingestion of vaccine containing
a live virus which caused the polio it was designed to prevent. The Court
stated:
In view of the established California rule that the consumer of
a food product may recover from the manufacturer upon implied
warranty, is there any reason to apply a different rule to the
vaccine here involved? We think not. The vaccine is intended for
human consumption quite as much as is food. We see no reason
to differentiate the policy considerations requiring pure and
wholesome food from those requiring pure and wholesome
vaccine.... The vaccine here involved is, like food products,
designed solely for introduction into the body of a human being.
Id. at 607, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
:11 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
:1 Id. at 61-62, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
32 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d
81,82 (1963).
33 Shipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
34 196 So. 2d 205, 208 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967).
35 206 So. 2d 19, 22 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968).
31; 185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967), rev'd 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
37 Id. at 756.
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mutter has been abandoned as to blood banks,38 it is still very
much a factor in litigation against hospitals. 3
The Russell case is the leading case in Florida defining a
blood bank's potential liability for the transfusion of blood.
The court of appeals stated that the blood bank could be held
liable only for failure to detect a substance capable of detec-
tion and removal, and that if in fact the SH virus was not
capable of removal, no liability would attach.40  The opinion
went on to say that the burden of proving an inability to
detect the virus would be on the defendant blood bank.41 That
decision was modified by the Florida Supreme Court 42 on the
basis that both the trial court and the district court of appeals
had gone beyond the controlling question-was there a sale
by the blood bank which could support a cause of action.
43
The supreme court opinion stated:
The question of whether there is a recognized method of detec-
tion was premature since that question is one of fact, and it was
error for the trial court to settle it with a pronouncement of law.
For that reason it was premature and error for the District Court
to undertake to settle as a question of law that, which under the
pleadings, would be a question of fact. We do not here review,
consider or decide as a question of law whether or not there is
a recognized method of detection... nor have we considered
whether, if established by the fact, such would constitute a legal
defense as that question is premature for the same reason. (em-
phasis added) 
44
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts is especially
interesting in that he felt that the court should have decided
the issue of detectability as a matter of law.45 Relying on
Green v. American Tobacco Company,40 Justice Roberts stated
after reviewing the Florida products liability cases:
These decisions stand for the proposition that the seller of
a product intended for human consumption is liable for injurious
consequences resulting from the consumption of a defective or
adulterated product, even though it was at the time of the sale
38 Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205, 208 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967).
39 Id.
40 185 So. 2d at 755, rev'd 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
41 Id.
42 Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
43 Id. at 117.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 121 (Roberts, J., concurring opinion).
46 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). "[A] manufacturer's or seller's actual
knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome
condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied
warranty .... " Id. at 170. No reasonable distinction can, in our opinion,
be made between the physical or practical impossibility of obtaining
knowleldge of a dangerous condition, and scientific inability resulting
from a current lack of human knowledge and skill." Id. at 171.
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and consumption of such product practically or scientifically im-
possible to discover the defect or adulteration of such product.
4 7
B. Breach of Warranty
In Perlmutter the majority in holding that the transfusion
of blood was a service and not a sale reasoned that if the
transaction were to be considered a sale, liability would auto-
matically attach, and the hospital would become an insurer of
injuries from "bad" blood transfusions.4 S In view of this belief
-that liability would be automatic for a breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability-it is interesting that this theory
of liability has not been more frequently advanced. The only
other reported case that rests directly on the Code's warranty
of merchantability is another New York case, Carter v. Inter-
Faith Hospital.
49
In Carter the court worked around cases apparently ex-
tending the service rule of Perlmutter to commercial blood
banks and concluded that if the no-sale rule of Perlmutter had
in fact been extended to commercial blood banks these cases
were overruled in that respect.5 °1 The court said that Code
warranties attached to the sale by a blood bank and that: "If
in fact the blood sold by the blood bank contains serum
hepatitis and causes injury, it is not fit for the ordinary pur-
pose for which it is used and would in turn give rise to a claim
for breach of warranty.' '
The fact that the plaintiff in Carter was not in privity with
defendant blood bank was held not to bar his recovery under
the Code.52  The relied on Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp.,;' as authority for the proposition that privity is
not required if plaintiff is one reasonably contemplated to be
part of the distributive chain of the product.;4 Although this
was an easy way to circumvent the privity doctrine of the
code, it is submitted that the Kollsman decision is one based
47 196 So. 2d 115, 119-20 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., concurring opinion).
48 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792,
795 (1954).
49 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
50 "The basis of the Perlhnutter decision was that the supplying of blood
by a hospital to a patient is incidental to the services rendered and is
not a sale. In the instant situation, we have solely a transfer of blood and
no services are rendered by the blood bank to the hospital." Id. at 735,
304 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100.
51 Id. at 736, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 101. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314
(2) (c).
52 60 Misc. 2d 733, 736, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
53 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
54 Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82.
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on strict liability in tort rather than on a warranty of mer-
chantability, 55 and although the Code is not intended to re-
strict the development of case law on the question of privity,5"
the court for the sake of clarity should have recognized
Kollsman for what it is.
Upon deciding that a cause of action had been stated for
breach of warranty, the Carter court did not grant judgment
summarily,57 as the majority in Perlmutter reasoned would be
the case.'8  Rather, the case was sent back to trial for the
development of a record on the issue of detectability of serum
hepatitis virus in blood so that the court might weigh "[a]ll
factors in regard to public policy . . . a weighing of interest
between the unfortunate patients who contract the disease and
the general public who are in constant need of blood from
these commercial blood banks.' '51 Given this summation it is
difficult to predict whether the courts would in fact strictly
apply the warranty of merchantability or make some judicial
exception on the basis of social policy to deny plaintiff's ap-
parent statutory relief.
While Carter is the only recent case to rest solely on the
basis of an implied warranty of merchantability, the case of
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital'" contained a claim of both a
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability and a cause
of action premised on strict liability in tortc" The trial court
dismissed both claims and the intermediate appellate court
affirmed but remanded for consideration of the negligence
issue. "- The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded for a further development of the record to justify such
dismissal."'
5Id.
5; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 Comment 3.
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its pro-
visions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond
this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge, or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warran-
ties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in
the distributive chain. Id.
It is then possible for a party to be brought under the Code by the
development of case law and the courts are free to eliminate the require-
ment of privity as to all non-purchasers, even those outside of the
distributive chain. Shanker, supra note 1, at 25.
60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
5S See note 13 supra.
59 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
60 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), rev'd 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65
(1969).
4;1 Id. at 321, 232 A.2d at 882.
42 Id. at 333, 232 A2d at 890.
63 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 67 (1969). A later New Jersey case which
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The courts have then had occasion to deal with Code war-
ranties of merchantability of fitness; but the two decisions
since Perlmutter construing such fitness warranties have been
influenced by policy factors, and both courts have essentially
denied recovery on a warranty theory by either remanding
for more information6 4 or by asking that a trial court record
concerning the detectability of SH virus be made (indicating
that their decision would be one of policy based on that
finding) .65
While it would seem that once the warranty of merchant-
ability was breached liability would automatically attach,66
the Carter case indicates that this may not be so in relation to
transfusions of blood.'
Perhaps a more important consideration in evaluating the
application of liability under the Code would be a review of
the provisions for disclaimer of implied warranties of mer-
chantability. The question of disclaimer of an expressed or
implied warranty has been litigated only once in connection
with the transfusion of impure blood, but with the increasing
number of cases holding that a possibility exists for liability
to attach to a transfusion of infected blood, disclaimers of lia-
bility for the presence of hepatitis virus are likely to become
more common. In Jackson there was an express disclaimer of
this type.6 8 The court relied upon the inability to detect the
virus and declared the disclaimer reasonable under section 2-316
of the Code"' without making reference to the issue of un-
conscionability of disclaiming physical injuries developed by
2-719(3).70 This seems to be more of a policy decision than
a strict interpretation of the Code. This is quite surprising in
referred to Jackson mentioned that Jackson never came to trial after
remand but was amicably settled between the parties and the action was
dismissed with prejudice. Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center,
109 N.J. Super. 217, 223, 262 A.2d 902, 906 (1970).
64 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 67 (1969).
Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101
(Sup. Ct. 1969). "This court feels that the approach taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital... is correct."
Id. at 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
66 See note 13 supra.
"i7 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
48 "Despite the utmost care in the selection of donors, human blood may
contain the virus of Homologous Serum Hepatitus. Therefore Eastern
Blood Bank does not warrant against its presence in this blood." Id. at
320, 232 A.2d at 882.
69 Id. at 329, 232 A.2d at 888.
70 On further appeal the case was reversed and remanded for other reasons.
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 67 (1969).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
light of the fact that the New Jersey courts have traditionally
not been overly impressed by disclaimers seeking to limit lia-
bility from injury caused by defective products."' The protec-
tion against disclaimer provided by section 2-719(3) should be
considered an important part of plaintiff's case based on war-
ranty theory, and although Jackson is an indication to the con-
trary, arguably, such liability may not be capable of dis-
claimer under the Code.
While it has been claimed that strict liability has not been
attained within the framework of the Code,7 2 a review of the
applicable sections and the case law would seem to indicate
the opposite conclusion. Even though section 2-316 provides
for the disclaimer of implied warranties attached to a sale of
goods,73 section 2-719(3) states that any attempt to limit con-
sequential damages involving personal injuries is prima facie
unconscionable.
7 4
The test to be used in determining whether a contract or
clause is unconscionable is to be resolved by an examination
of the needs of the trade and the relative bargaining posi-
tions of the parties at the time of the making of the contract.7 5
The presumption that a disclaimer of liability for physical
injuries is prima facie unconscionable is an attempted move
toward strict liability for breach of warranty,7 6 and a review
of the cases before and since the formulation of the Code
lends support to the proposition that section 2-719(3) is an
attempt to prohibit the manufacturer or someone in a superior
bargaining position from defining his own liability for personal
injury.
77
71 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)
is an example of this attitude. In that case there was an express warranty
to make repairs for defects of materials and workmanship and a dis-
claimer of all other warranties regarding an automobile. The car was
defective and injury was sustained by the plaintiff. The court held
that such disclaimers were not favored and were to be strictly con-
strued against the manufacturer. Id. at 373, 161 A.2d at 77-78. The court
stated further that the types of disclaimers contemplated by the Sales
Act were those disclaimers arrived at by relatively equal parties with
some real freedom of choice as to the type of contract selected. Id. at
404,161 A.2d at 95.
72 Comment, The Application of the Doctrine of Unconscionability to War-
ranties: A More Forward Strict Liability within the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75-76 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
73 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
7 Id. § 2-719 (3).
t- Id. § 2-302 Comment 1.
76 Comment, supra note 72 at 80.
77 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949) (unequal bar-
gaining power); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778
(1968); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (unconscionable disclaimer).
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C. Comparison of the Two Doctrines
The theories of warranty under the Code and strict tort
liability have been discussed; the question remains whether
there are any real differences between them. Both theories
generally require a sale by a person normally engaged in sell-
ing such a product, and both strict liability and the Code
have overlapping rules to govern the liabilities which arise.78
Strict liability in tort requires that the injury result from
the use of a "defective" product, while the Code requires that
the injury result from goods not of merchantable quality; but
the definitions "defect" and "non-merchantability" are appar-
ently synonymous. 71 One writer has even suggested that all of
the cases decided under the theory of strict liability could have
been decided exactly the same way under the Code.80
Privity of contract has traditionally been a stumbling
block to recovery for injuries. Under contract theory the Code,
however, has expanded the scope of implied warranty to in-
clude not only the buyer but members of his household and
guests who may be reasonably expected to use the product."'
Some variations of the Code are much broader than this in
their abolition of privity -.8 2 The Code makes it clear that its
provisions governing privity are not to preclude the develop-
ment of case law redefining the warranties created by a sale
within the definition of the Code,"' and the decision in
Carter was seen to be an application of this principle.8 4 The
latitude left to the courts in developing the requirements of
78 Shanker, supra note 1, at 13.
79 Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts between
the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L.
REV. 69 (1965). "This definition of defect, appearing in cases involving
strict liability in tort, is closely related to the concept of defect as it ap-
pears in cases dealing with breach of implied warranty." Farr v. Arm-
strong Rubber Co., 179 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Minn. 1970).
80 Shanker, supra note 1, at 13.
81 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
82 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-318 (1963).
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section. Id.
8" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 Comment 3.
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its pro-
visions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Be-
yond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether a seller's warranties,
given to the buyer who resells, extends to other persons in the
distributive chain. Id.
84 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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privity is felt to be very broad.85 Thus, privity, in a suit on a
breach of warranty theory, should not be a major problem
in suing a blood bank and is definitely no bar to a suit by a
patient against a hospital.
8 6
One distinction between the Code warranty of merchant-
ability and a cause of action in strict liability is the applicable
statute of limitations. Should the statute of limitations run
from the time of the sale or from the time of the injury?
Under the Code the time of breach of an implied warranty is
the date of sale"7 while under a tort theory breach occurs at
the time of the injury.88 The time of the running of the
statute of limitations can be a very important aspect of a case
when a latent defect is the cause of injury. Different juris-
dictions have treated the problem differently-some have
created a new warranty action in tort,"' while others have
limited recovery to the time specified in the Code. °
Although the causes of action labled "strict liability in
tort" and "breach of warranty of merchantability" are strik-
ingly similar and may present identical causes of action in
the average case, there is one distinct difference in attempt-
ing to recover against a supplier of blood using a strict liability
approach as opposed to a warranty approach. While the Code
makes no allowance for the present state of human knowledge,
comment k of § 402 A, Restatement of Torts (Second) makes a
85 "It thus seems clear that the courts, if they wish to do so, may eliminate
the privity requirement as to all non-purchasers, even those outside
the distributive chain." Shanker, supra note 1, at 27.
86 The only state to decide that such a cause of action may be stated against
a hospital is Illinois in the case of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hcspital, 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 133 (1969), aff'd Ill. Sup. Ct. Nos.
42526, 42578 cons. (Mar. 1970). The court stated that the sales-service
dichotomy of Perlmutter and other decisions was "too simple and that
to maintain an artificial barrier around blood is not sensible." Id. at 80,
251 N.E.2d at 135. The Cunninghan court, however, did not hold as a
matter of law that an inability to detect serum hepatitis in blood would
not be a defense in law. Id. at 86, 251 N.E.2d at 139. The Cunningham
case, therefore, does not appear to extend the possibility of recovery
on the theory of strict liability further than other decided cases. See
notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra, and notes 92-100 and accom-
panying text infra. Cunningham is, however, important for it is the first
case to hold that the transfusion of blood is a sale of a product and
recovery for the transfusion of contaminated blood by a hospital on a
strict liability theory is not precluded where there is the presence of a
sale. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, supra at 86.
s8 Mendel v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 342, 305 N.Y.S.2d
490, 492, 253 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1969).
ss Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 755, 168 N.W.2d 177, 180
(1969).
81) Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d
149 (9th Cir. 1962); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
1 0 Mendel v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 342, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490,
492, 253 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1969).
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specific exception for some products from the application of
the rules of strict liability by classifying them as unavoidably
unsafe."'
There are several possible ways of avoiding the classifica-
tion of the transfusion of blood containing the serum hepatitis
virus as unavoidably unsafe under comment k. The first of
these methods is an argument that would take blood out of the
category of products intended to be exempted by comment k.
If blood can be made reasonably safe by the detection of the
virus in the blood of the donor "2 the fact that the virus can-
not be conclusively detected in blood should not be considered
relevant in classifying the product as unavoidably unsafe. The
Restatement standard is not that products must be capable of
being made absolutely safe; it is something less; the product
must be reasonably safe. To allow a product that is capable
of being made reasonably safe to be categorized as "unavoid-
ably unsafe" is to defeat the purpose of the Restatement by
sanctioning the non-use of preventive measures while research
goes on in a search of the "ultimate" test capable of determin-
ing the presence of the virus in blood.1
3
The application of comment k to the transfusion of blood
seems to be weak on another basis. The example of an un-
avoidably unsafe product used by the Restatement is the
Pasteur treatment for rabies. The Pasteur treatment does not
involve the use of a defective product, rather it involves a risk
attendant to a product which, although not defective, is cap-
able of causing serious consequences despite the fact that the
product is "pure" when used.94  Blood is not an analogous
product. In its usable form it does not contain the SH virus
and unlike the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment it is the
additive defect in the blood itself rather than the particular
idiosyncrasy of the recipient that causes the danger.
A third line of reasoning that might be advanced to over-
come the comment k defense is the concept presented in the
tobacco cases deciding liability for the contraction of lung
cancer. In Green v. American Tobacco Co.": the tobacco com-
pany defended on the ground that at the time plaintiff con-
tracted lung cancer the state of current scientific knowledge
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
112 See note 6 supra.
Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood,
23 ARK. L. REV. 236, 241-42 (1969).
94 Id. at 242.
95 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
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could not determine the causal link between smoking and lung
cancer. The Florida court put the practical impossibility of
obtaining knowledge of a dangerous condition (e.g. tainted
meat in a can or faulty mechanism inside a steering column)
and scientific inability resulting from a lack of human knowl-
edge and skill (e.g. causal link between smoking and lung
cancer) on the same level and decided that the policy rea-
sons for applying strict liability to one set of circumstances
were the same as for the other. 6 It was also stated that "a
manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity to
know of a defect or unwholesome condition is wholly irrele-
vant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty."97
This theory was advanced by Justice Roberts in his con-
currence in Russell!' and seems a viable method of attacking
the theory of denial of recovery on the basis of the undetect-
able nature of the hepatitis virus. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Green case has not been adhered to consist-
ently and was modified by Louisiana in Lartigue v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co."' where the court said "it is necessary
to show that the warranted product contained an element from
which, on the basis of existing human knowledge a harm
might be expected to flow."' 100
Because of the problems presented by a possible classifica-
tion of blood as a product included in the Restatement's com-
ment k and the questionableness of Green being good prece-
dent for the denial of a distinction between practical and
scientific impossibilities of discovering a defect, plaintiff's case
might be made more tenuous and recovery more easily deni-
able under a tort theory of pleading. An action tried under a
theory of breach of warranty of merchantability would seem-
ingly make no exception for liability on the basis that the
product is incapable of being made absolutely safe.
CONCLUSION
Although in a particular case a plaintiff may be armed
with adequate theories for legal recovery for injuries sustained
!16 Id. at 171.
97 Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
' 196 So. 2d 115, 119 (Fla. 1967).
,: 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
1"" Id. at 35. This modification appears to require that whether or not a
harmful substance is detectable, and whether or not the language of
Green is the accepted test, before liability can attach a showing must be
made that the harmful agent must be one known to produce the result-
ing harm.
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as the result of an infected blood transfusion, the ultimate
issue is one of balancing opposing policy considerations. On
the one hand blood banks and hospitals are considered to be
institutions which should be given more than the normal
amount of protection from the growing doctrines of products
liability law than is afforded other enterprises.'0 ' Yet to deny
recovery to individual persons injured is to subvert the very
doctrine of spreading consumer losses which is at the heart
of products liability law.
The question of liability for the transfusion of impure
blood is an issue that has aroused enough medical institution
concern to have been the impetus in 19 states for the adoption
of statutes specifically exempting the suppliers of infected
blood from liability. 0 2 The courts have stated that the ques-
tion of liability in this area is more properly one that should
be defined by the legislature. 10 3
It is submitted that the attitude of the legislatures is in-
correct. The imposition of liability on blood banks and hos-
pitals for transfusion of infected blood would induce these
institutions to make the very adjustments which products lia-
bility precipitates. To force hospitals and blood banks to
absorb the loss of injury to innocent patients is to force them
to spread the loss by increasing prices to consumers of the
product. One method would be to insure against consumer
loss through liability insurance. 1 04  This solution avoids the
untenable consequence of placing the whole burden upon a
singularly injured party whose unfortunate fate has placed
him in the position to be injured. This approach is directly
in line with the philosophy of spreading risks embodied in the
emerging law of products liability.
101 See note 9 supra.
102 ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 2-314 (1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1970);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A,
§ 2-316 (Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1968); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1764 (West
1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (1970); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-316 (1971); MicH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 691.1511 (1968); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 7129-71 (1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-400 (Supp. 1969); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-12-5 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33.3 (1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1969); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 32-55-9 (1970); S.D. CODE § 57-4-33.1 (1970); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 146.31 (1970). Colorado has enacted but has not yet published
such a measure, S. 83, 48th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1971); it has been re-
ported that Utah has done likewise, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1971,
at 1, col. 1.
103 Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Mis. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 97, 102
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
104 Additional advantages of this policy would be an increased emphasis in
research and development, higher standards of donor screening, and a
reluctance of hospitals to deal with blood banks of questionable repu-
tation.
